Introduction

In the lexicon of ordinary human discourse, the declaration that an object, experience, or phenomenon is "not to my taste" functions as a socially acceptable boundary, a benign assertion of individual preference that organizes human communities, dictates economic consumption, and establishes personal identity.1 Within the parameters of conventional reality, we judge the aesthetic merits of others, cultivate our own distinct sensibilities, and deploy these judgments to navigate the myriad choices of daily existence.1 However, when subjected to the rigorous, deconstructive analytical framework of Buddhist epistemology, psychology, and phenomenology, this seemingly innocuous statement reveals itself as a profound encapsulation of saṃsāric entanglement. From the perspective of early Buddhist doctrine and later Mahāyāna philosophical developments, the arrogant pretense underlying aesthetic preference represents a classic, textbook manifestation of Avijjā (ignorance) and Māna (conceit).2 It reflects a systemic and foundational failure to recognize the empty, conditioned nature of reality, defined in Buddhist philosophy as Śūnyatā (emptiness) and Pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination).5

By conflating a highly subjective, transiently conditioned psychological response with an objective, inherent quality of the external object—a cognitive error highly analogous to the Western philosophical concept of naïve realism—the individual fortifies the illusion of an autonomous, enduring ego.3 This fortification fundamentally violates the central Buddhist principle of Anattā (non-self).3 Furthermore, the enshrinement of this transient, biologically and karmically conditioned reflex as an authoritative ideological standard results in Diṭṭhi-upādāna (the clinging to views).10 This clinging generates a subtle yet pervasive form of suffering (dukkha) and interpersonal separation, fracturing the interconnected reality of dependent origination into isolated, warring solipsisms.12

The comprehensive analysis that follows systematically deconstructs the cognitive architecture of aesthetic preference. It traces the genesis of aesthetic judgment from the rudimentary, impersonal arising of sensory contact and feeling (vedanā) through the labyrinthine, ego-constructing process of conceptual proliferation (papañca) mapped in the early Pāli discourses.13 By integrating the epistemological critiques of the logician Dharmakīrti, the ontological deconstructions of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, and the psychological maps provided by the Abhidhamma, the report will demonstrate how the mundane act of exercising taste is, in actuality, a microcosm of the entire mechanism of existential delusion. To declare something "not to my taste" is not merely an aesthetic choice; it is an epistemological claim about the nature of reality, a psychological defense of the ego, and a karmic action that perpetuates the cycle of suffering.

The Ontological Ground of Perception: The Aggregates and the Absence of the Aesthetic Subject

To fully comprehend the fallacy inherent in the assertion of personal taste, one must first examine the microscopic mechanics of cognition and the ontological status of the perceiving subject within Buddhist philosophy. Early Buddhist texts, particularly the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the psychological discourses of the Majjhima Nikāya, unequivocally reject the notion of a static, enduring mind that "possesses" experiences or "holds" a taste.14 Instead, the entity conventionally referred to as a "person" or a "self" is analyzed as a rapid succession of ownerless, dependently originated physical and mental events.14

The Five Aggregates (Pañcakkhandhā) and the Dissection of Identity

The Buddhist analytical method deconstructs the illusion of a unified experiencing subject into five distinct aggregates (khandhas):

1. Rūpa (Corporeality or Matter): The physical elements, including the sense organs and the external objects of perception.14

2. Vedanā (Feeling or Sensation): The raw affective tone of an experience, categorized strictly as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral.14

3. Saññā (Perception or Recognition): The cognitive faculty that recognizes, labels, and identifies an object by synthesizing sensory data.14

4. Saṅkhāra (Mental Formations or Volition): The complex web of volitional activities, habits, predispositions, and karmic tendencies.14

5. Viññāṇa (Consciousness): The bare awareness of an object, arising strictly in dependence upon a sense faculty and a sense object.14

Strictly speaking, within this framework, consciousness (viññāṇa) is neither an agent that cognizes nor an instrument through which cognition takes place.14 It is merely the sequential process of cognizing an object. As articulated in early Buddhist thought, consciousness is not an entity that exists, but an event that occurs—an event catalyzed solely by appropriate antecedent conditions.14 It is an activity without an actor behind it. The Buddha explicitly cautioned against taking the mind as a self, noting that while the physical body might appear to endure for decades, that which is called "mind" or "consciousness" arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night, much like a monkey swinging through a forest, grabbing one branch only to immediately let it go and grab another.14

The Avenues of Sense Perception and the Impersonality of Contact

This deconstruction is further refined through the categorization of reality into the twelve avenues of sense-perception (āyatanas) and the eighteen elements (dhātus).14 The twelve āyatanas comprise the six internal sense faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) and their six corresponding external objects (forms, sounds, odors, flavors, tangibles, mind-objects).16

When a visual form, an auditory tone, or a physical flavor is encountered, it is not an enduring, centralized ego that observes the object. Rather, the meeting of the internal sense faculty, the external object, and the corresponding sense-consciousness constitutes a purely mechanical, impersonal event known as contact (phassa).13 Contact is the spark of cognition. If one were to analyze the encounter with an avant-garde painting or a dissonant piece of music—an encounter that might elicit the verdict "not to my taste"—the initial phase of this encounter involves absolutely no "I" and no "taste." It involves only the transient collision of eye-sensitivity, visible form, and eye-consciousness.15

Because the combination of consciousness, mental factors, and matter forms what is merely conventionally called a human being, beings overwhelmed by ignorance wrongly take this kinetic flux as a static "self".15 They observe the continuous stream of aesthetic encounters and generate the thought: "The matter is mine; I am the matter and the matter is my self".15 This fundamental misapprehension of the ontological ground of perception forms the bedrock upon which the entire edifice of aesthetic pretense is built. By failing to see that the observer is an empty, conditioned process, the individual assumes an unwarranted authority, elevating a mechanical sensory collision into a grand declaration of personal identity.

Vedanā and the Primordial Genesis of Preference

If contact (phassa) provides the spark of cognition, feeling (vedanā) provides the raw, unrefined material out of which aesthetic preferences are ultimately forged.17 In the Buddhist analysis of reality, vedanā occupies an absolutely critical juncture; it is the second of the five aggregates and, crucially, the seventh link in the twelvefold chain of Dependent Origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda)—the precise link that leads directly to the arising of craving (taṇhā).17

The Taxonomy and Nature of Feeling

Vedanā, derived from the Sanskrit/Pāli root √vid (meaning both "to feel" and "to know"), represents the fundamental affective aspect of the process of knowing.17 It is essential to understand that in early Buddhist psychology, vedanā is not yet a complex emotion, a thought, or an aesthetic judgment. It is a rudimentary, pre-conceptual reaction that registers an object's affective impact on the nervous system and the mind.17

The early texts exhaustively classify vedanā. Irrespective of its exposition, it is fundamentally characterized as either:

1. Pleasant (Sukha): Agreeable, comfortable, or desirable.

2. Unpleasant or Painful (Dukkha): Disagreeable, uncomfortable, or aversive.

3. Neither-painful-nor-pleasant (Adukkhamasukha): Neutral, indifferent, or subtle.21

Furthermore, these feelings are divided into bodily (kāyika) and mental (cetasika) feelings, as well as worldly (sāmisa) and unworldly (nirāmisa) feelings.21 In the context of aesthetic preference, the object that ultimately triggers the arrogant verdict "not to my taste" initiates its cognitive journey simply as a worldly, unpleasant (dukkha) or neutral (adukkhamasukha) vedanā.21

Vedanā and the Activation of Underlying Tendencies (Anusaya)

The profound danger of vedanā lies in its intimate, near-instantaneous connection to latent, unconscious psychological drives known as underlying tendencies (anusaya).22 The early Buddhist framework posits that the raw affective tone of an experience automatically activates these dormant defilements long before the conscious, rational mind can intervene or formulate an intellectual judgment.23

As demonstrated in the table above, the initial rejection of an object—the primordial seed of distaste—is not born from an objective, rational analysis of the object's inherent aesthetic demerits.22 It is a biologically and karmically conditioned reflex driven by the latent tendency of aversion (paṭigha). When feeling arises following a sense impression, the latent tendency of lust will interpret it as a pleasant feeling, while the latent tendency of aversion will interpret it as an unpleasant or aversive feeling.22

The individual's past karma, cultural upbringing, social conditioning, physical health, and biological constraints dictate which specific objects will produce an unpleasant feeling.7 For example, a piece of music that utilizes a specific microtonal scale may produce a highly unpleasant auditory vedanā in an individual conditioned exclusively by Western equal temperament, activating the paṭigha-anusaya. Conversely, the same auditory input may produce a pleasant vedanā in someone conditioned by Middle Eastern or Indian classical traditions, activating the rāga-anusaya.

Because the observer remains ignorant of this deeply conditioned, mechanical interplay between sensory contact, affective feeling, and latent psychological tendencies, they fail to arrest the cognitive process. Instead of mindfully observing the unpleasant feeling as a transient, dependently originated phenomenon, the mind proceeds to the next stage of cognitive distortion, transforming a brief physiological and mental contraction into a rigid, ego-defending philosophy of taste.

The Cognitive Rupture of Papañca: The Madhupiṇḍika Sutta’s Map of Proliferation

The transition from a raw, impersonal feeling (vedanā) to the arrogant pretense of a formalized aesthetic judgment is mapped with clinical precision in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta (MN 18).13 This discourse plays a central role in the early Buddhist analysis of human conflict and the genesis of subjective delusion. It introduces and dissects the concept of papañca (conceptual proliferation or diversification), defined as the mind's tendency to elaborate, obsess, construct complex narratives, and superimpose concepts around simple sensory data.13

Papañca is notoriously difficult to translate, but it generally derives from the Sanskrit root √pañc, meaning "spreading" or "expansion".25 In the context of aesthetic judgment, papañca represents the conceptual avalanche that follows a simple sensory feeling. The commentaries identify the springs of this proliferation as three specific factors: craving (taṇhā), conceit (māna), and views (diṭṭhi).26 It is on account of mental proliferation rooted in these three defilements that the mind colors and embellishes bare experience by interpreting it in terms of "mine," "I," and "my self".26

The Three Phases of Sense Perception

Scholar Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda’s seminal analysis, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought, divides the cognitive sequence described in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta into three distinct phenomenological phases, illustrating the exact moment the delusion of taste is born.27

Maññanā and the Grammatical Introduction of the Ego

The crucial epistemological rupture occurs precisely between Phase One and Phase Two. In Phase One, the sequence is articulated in a strictly impersonal tone, reflecting the objective reality of Dependent Origination: "Dependent on eye & forms, eye-consciousness arises... With contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling".13 Here, the experience is ownerless.

However, beginning with Phase Two, the syntax abruptly shifts from a passive, objective description ("feeling arises") to an active, subject-driven syntax: "What one feels, one perceives. What one perceives, one thinks about".13 This grammatical shift is not a stylistic accident; it precisely mirrors the psychological phenomenon of maññanā (conceiving), an egocentric distortion elaborated extensively in the Mūlapariyāya Sutta (MN 1).31

From the root man ("to think"), maññanā refers to a distorted form of cognition that projects onto sense data characteristics they do not inherently possess.31 It operates on the assumption of a perspective which is fictitious—the perspective of someone who is conceiving this experience, the perspective of a self.31 On the basis of that assumption, it constructs the sense data into something solid that will confirm this initial assumption of selfhood.31 The Mūlapariyāya Sutta explains how perceiving an element (like earth) leads to conceiving it in various ways ("earth", "in earth", "from earth"), followed by treating it as "mine" and delighting in it.33

When an individual declares a painting, a piece of music, or a culinary dish "not to my taste," they have successfully and blindly traversed all three phases of the Madhupiṇḍika sequence. An impersonal, unpleasant vedanā has been aggressively appropriated by maññanā as "my" feeling. The mind has then proliferated (papañca) around this feeling, thinking about it (vitakka), analyzing its differences from other experiences, and constructing an elaborate aesthetic theory to justify the initial reflex.27

Finally, in Phase Three, the individual is assaulted by their own conceptual constructs (papañca-saññā-saṅkhā). The vicious proliferating tendency of the worldling's consciousness weaves a labyrinthine network of concepts connecting past, present, and future.29 The person becomes the victim of their own perceptions and thought constructions, mistaking their internally generated proliferation for an absolute, objective reality.22 The aesthetic "taste" has now become a rigid, externalized standard that dominates the observer, completely obscuring the original, transient sensory contact from which it arose.

Naïve Realism and the Epistemological Error of Inherent Qualities

At the very core of aesthetic pretense is a massive epistemological fallacy highly akin to what Western philosophy terms naïve realism (or direct realism): the belief that sensory perception places the observer in direct, unmediated contact with external, mind-independent objects, and that those objects inherently possess the qualities the observer perceives.9 When a person claims an object is "distasteful," "ugly," or "unrefined," they are operating under the unexamined assumption that the ugliness or lack of refinement resides as an objective, independent property within the object itself, completely separate from the observer's mind.

Dharmakīrti’s Ontological Minimalism and the Critique of Relations

The Buddhist epistemological tradition (pramāṇavāda), particularly through the highly rigorous framework established by the logician Dharmakīrti (and his predecessor Dignāga), systematically dismantles the realist assertion that objects possess inherent, independent properties that relate to a perceiving subject.36 In his pursuit of an ontological minimalism, Dharmakīrti targets the descriptive metaphysics supporting the naïve realism of the Nyāya school.38

In his text, the Sambandhaparīkṣā (Examination of Relations), Dharmakīrti advances the thesis "Sambandho nāsti tattvataḥ" ("There are no relations, in reality").38 He aims to refute the concept of "relation in general" to preemptively dismiss all specific kinds of relations posited by realists to connect the constituents of the world.38 His primary dialectical strategy relies on a strict locative definition of relation: a relation must always hold between at least two distinct, discrete, and simultaneously existing things, and must exist "in" those two things.38

If one argues that the property of "tastiness" or "ugliness" inheres within an aesthetic object, Dharmakīrti demonstrates that this requires an impossible ontological relation, systematically destroying the realist models of inherence (samavāya) and contact (saṃyoga) 38:

1. Refutation of the Amalgamation Model (rūpaleśa): If a relation is understood as an amalgamation or commingling (where the object and its aesthetic property merge), Dharmakīrti argues that it ceases to be a relation. If there is a genuine merging of forms, the relata are no longer separately available; what remains is a single merged identity.38 Since a relation, by definition, must connect two distinct relata, a single identity cannot qualify as a relation.38

2. Refutation of the Dependence Model: If the relation is based on dependence, Dharmakīrti argues it fails on temporal and existential grounds. Two independently produced relata cannot exhibit dependence. Furthermore, dependence cannot hold before phenomena are produced, as a non-existent entity cannot bear the property of expecting or requiring something (apekṣādharma).38 Conversely, a fully established, existing discrete entity no longer needs to depend on anything.38

3. The Simultaneity Dilemma in Causality: Even regarding causal relations, Dharmakīrti notes that cause and effect do not co-exist simultaneously. Because one relatum is absent when the other is present, a relation cannot hold between them in extra-mental reality.38

4. The Infinite Regress: If the property of "ugly" is distinct from the object, and the relation of inherence connects them, there must be a further relation to connect this inherence to the property, and another to connect it to the object, triggering an infinite regress.38

Therefore, according to Dharmakīrti's conceptualist nominalism, the relation between the object and its supposed aesthetic value is entirely a mental construct (vikalpa or kalpanāpoḍha) imposed by consciousness.36 For the Buddhist logician, perception yields altogether uninterpreted data—unique particulars under no description.38 The moment the mind steps in to distinguish a separate qualifier (the aesthetic judgment) and a qualificand (the object), it has engaged in a constitutively conceptual operation.38

Consequently, the arrogant declaration "not to my taste" is revealed not as the sophisticated detection of a real, objective deficiency in the physical world, but as a hallucination. It is the projection of the mind's own historically and karmically organized categories—a superimposition of conceptual relations onto a reality that is fundamentally, ontologically devoid of them.

Śūnyatā, Pratītyasamutpāda, and the Emptiness of Beauty

The critique of naïve realism reaches its ontological zenith in the Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna. Where Dharmakīrti focuses intensely on the epistemological mechanics of perception and logic, Nāgārjuna addresses the ultimate ontological status of the phenomena themselves through the revolutionary doctrine of Śūnyatā (emptiness).5

In his magnum opus, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), Nāgārjuna establishes the absolute equivalence of Śūnyatā and Pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination).5 Emptiness does not mean non-existence or a nihilistic void; rather, it is defined specifically as the lack of svabhāva (inherent existence, self-nature, or independent substance).41 Because all phenomena arise conditionally—depending on causes, conditions, parts, and the labeling consciousness—no single phenomenon can possess independent, static, or isolated self-existence.5

The Mutual Dependence of Aesthetic Dualisms

If an object possessed inherent beauty (subha) or inherent ugliness (asubha) as a core part of its svabhāva, that quality would necessarily be static, eternal, and universally perceptible to all sentient beings at all times in all realms.44 A painting that is inherently beautiful could never be perceived as ugly, because its beauty would not depend on the observer's eye, their cultural background, their mood, or their evolutionary biology.

Yet, aesthetic experience is notoriously and demonstrably subjective. As Nāgārjuna (echoing earlier philosophical traditions) argues, conceptual dualisms such as beauty and ugliness, good and bad, long and short, are mutually posited in their emergence.44 One cannot exist without relation to the other.45 Beauty and ugliness are not fixed in the thing itself; they are strictly in the mind.46

The Extremes of Absolutism and Reification

To assert "not to my taste" with arrogant pretense is therefore to commit a profound ontological error. The Madhyamaka framework identifies two dangerous philosophical extremes: nihilism (the belief that things do not exist at all) and absolutism/substantialism (the belief that things inherently exist).34

The arrogant aesthete falls into the trap of absolutism. They attempt to reify the conventional—to take a highly transient, dependently originated event (a fleeting convergence of a specific sense object, a specific biological sense organ, and a historically conditioned consciousness) and imbue it with absolute reality.9 By isolating an object from the vast, dynamic, and infinite web of dependent origination and stamping it with a fixed, heavy label of distaste, the individual engages in a subtle form of violence against reality. They freeze the fluid, interdependent nature of existence to satisfy the ego's desire for a predictable, categorized, and manageable universe. They fail to understand that reality, including themselves and the object they judge, is "nothing but images of images," entirely devoid of an absolute anchor.47

Māna and the Anattā Violation in Aesthetic Measuring

While Avijjā (ignorance) provides the ontological blindness necessary to sustain the illusion of taste, and papañca builds the conceptual framework, it is Māna (conceit) that provides the psychological enforcement and the emotional arrogance.8 In Theravāda Abhidhamma and general Buddhist psychology, Māna is a highly complex mental factor. It is not merely arrogance, pride, or overt boasting; its etymological root means "to measure" or "to compare".4 Māna is the mind's habitual, reflexive, and deeply ingrained tendency to evaluate itself in relation to others or to the world, thereby cementing the illusion of a separate "I".4

The Three Modes and Nine Expansions of Conceit

According to the Vidhā Sutta (SN 45.162) of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, the Buddha categorized Māna into three primary modes of measuring:

1. Seyya Māna (Superiority Conceit): The thought "I am superior."

2. Sadisa Māna (Equality Conceit): The thought "I am equal."

3. Hīna Māna (Inferiority Conceit): The thought "I am inferior".4

The Abhidhamma further expands these three basic conceits into nine specific types, depending on whether the comparison of oneself with others is conventionally justified (yathāva māna) or unjustified (ayathāva māna) based on mundane facts.8

The profound and radical insight of Buddhist psychology is that all nine forms of conceit must be utterly abandoned, even the conventionally justified ones.8 Why? Because the very act of measuring—whether accurate or inaccurate in the worldly sense—requires a stable, enduring entity to serve as the yardstick.

Aesthetic Preference as an Engine of Sakkāya Diṭṭhi

Aesthetic preference is a highly potent, socially sanitized vehicle for Māna. The statement "not to my taste" rarely functions as a neutral transmission of data. Implicitly, it establishes a hierarchy. When an individual rejects a piece of art, a genre of literature, a style of clothing, or a philosophical view as distasteful, they are almost inevitably engaging in Seyya Māna (Superiority Conceit).8 They are asserting that their discriminatory faculties, their refined palate, or their intellectual conditioning are superior to the object in question, and by extension, superior to those unenlightened masses who do happen to enjoy the object.4

The Atthasālinī (the commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇī) defines conceit as having haughtiness as its characteristic, self-praise as its function, and the desire to advertise the self like a banner as its manifestation.50 The aesthetic snob waves their distaste like a banner of identity. Even if the individual attempts to cloak their judgment in false humility—"It is simply not for me, I am not sophisticated enough to understand it"—this is merely a manifestation of Hīna Māna or Oṇamāna (inferiority conceit). It may seem humble, but it still clings fiercely to the idea of an "I" that is the lower one, keeping the subject bound to the illusion of self through constant comparison.4

To declare that an object does not meet one's standards is to assert that the "I" possessing those standards is a real, enduring entity. This is a direct, aggressive violation of Anattā (non-self).4 Because the physical body, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness are in constant flux, arising and ceasing, extracting a static aesthetic preference from this kinetic flow and labeling it "my taste" requires an extraordinary act of cognitive dissonance.8

The individual identifies with the aggregates, generating the self-identification view (sakkāya diṭṭhi).8 As the texts articulate, craving (taṇhā) whispers "This is mine"; conceit (māna) asserts "This I am"; and wrong view (diṭṭhi) concludes "This is my self".8 Together, these three form the papañca-dhammā—the forces that expand and prolong the suffering of saṃsāra.15 Because Māna thrives entirely on separation, distinction, and measurement, the constant assertion of personal taste alienates the individual from the interconnected web of reality. It builds an ivory tower of preference, inside which the fragile ego fortifies itself against the threatening truth of its own emptiness.

Diṭṭhi-upādāna and the Generation of Existential Separation

If vedanā provides the raw biological material of preference, and māna provides the egoic scaffolding, it is diṭṭhi (view) that pours the concrete, solidifying a passing fancy into a rigid dogma. In Buddhist doctrine, the stubborn clinging to aesthetic preference is understood as a manifestation of Diṭṭhi-upādāna (clinging to views).10

Upādāna (clinging, grasping, or fuel) is the ninth link in the chain of Dependent Origination, arising immediately conditioned by craving (taṇhā). It manifests in four distinct, increasingly subtle forms:

1. Kāmupādāna: Clinging to sense pleasures.

2. Diṭṭhi-upādāna: Clinging to false views, opinions, or ideologies.

3. Sīlabbatupādāna: Clinging to rites, rituals, and moral observances.

4. Attavādupādāna: Clinging to a doctrine of an individualized self-entity.10

Aesthetic taste occupies a unique, highly dangerous transitional space between kāmupādāna and diṭṭhi-upādāna. Initially, the desire for a visually beautiful object or the rejection of an ugly one is simple sense-desire (kāma). However, when an individual intellectually justifies this desire, elevating it to an overarching aesthetic theory, a marker of class, or a defining characteristic of their identity ("I am the type of person who finds this not to my taste"), the sensory preference mutates into an ideological view (diṭṭhi). The individual is no longer merely reacting to sensory input; they are aggressively defending a philosophical position.

The Pathology of View-Clinging in the Aṭṭhakavagga

The catastrophic social and psychological consequences of Diṭṭhi-upādāna are explored extensively in the Aṭṭhakavagga (The Chapter of Octads) of the Sutta Nipāta, one of the oldest and most profound strata of Buddhist literature. In the Paramatthaka Sutta (Sn 4.5), the Buddha explicitly addresses the conceit that arises from identifying with views and opinions.55 He notes that an individual who considers their own views as "supreme" (paramatthaka) in the world inevitably regards all other views as inferior.12 The text states: "A person who associates himself with certain views, considering them as best and making them supreme in the world, he says, because of that, that all other views are inferior; therefore he is not free from contention".12

The Kalahavivāda Sutta (Sn 4.11) traces a breathtakingly precise causal map demonstrating how the personalization of views leads directly to systemic, societal conflict.12 The sutta maps the progression: perception generates categories of papañca, which lead to contact, which leads to distinguishing the appealing from the unappealing. This generates desire, dividing the world dualistically into what is "dear and not-dear".12 From this division arises stinginess, envy, divisiveness, quarrels, and disputes.12

When someone arrogantly proclaims, "This is not to my taste," they are actively defending a territory. As noted in analyses of Proto-Buddhism, taste is a highly subjective, internal experience.11 One cannot directly observe another's subjective experience of a flavor, a sound, or a sight. Therefore, when individuals argue over aesthetic taste—debating the merits of music, film, or art—they are essentially engaged in a clash of completely isolated, solipsistic universes. Because a person's taste is entirely determined by unobservable factors—past life experiences, biological predispositions, friendships, and cultural upbringing—an attack on one's taste is perceived by the fragile ego as a direct, existential attack on the very life experiences that formed that identity.7

Therefore, Diṭṭhi-upādāna weaponizes a simple aesthetic mismatch, turning it into an existential threat. The individual feels compelled to defend their taste to defend their very existence. As long as opinions about reality are overlaid onto direct experience, the individual remains trapped in a secondary, derivative world—a "dead substitute of reality".7 The fully enlightened being (Arahant or Buddha), conversely, has abandoned all clinging to views.58 They experience the sensory input directly (yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti) without the papañca that objectifies, classifies, and clings to the experience as "good" or "bad," rendering them incapable of the conceit that generates conflict.58

Avijjā as the Root Matrix of Aesthetic Delusion

Beneath the elaborate, towering architecture of papañca, the aggressive, measuring posturing of māna, and the ideological rigidity of diṭṭhi, lies the deep, subterranean taproot of all saṃsāric entanglement: Avijjā (ignorance).2 In the context of the standard presentation of Dependent Origination (Pratītyasamutpāda), Avijjā holds the dubious honor of being the first link, the fundamental, primordial blindness that sets the entire machinery of suffering into motion.2

Avijjā is not a mere passive absence of information, nor is it a lack of worldly intelligence or aesthetic refinement. It is an active "unseeing," a fundamental misconception and deeply ingrained delusion regarding the nature of metaphysical reality.3 Specifically, it is defined as the failure to understand the Four Noble Truths and the failure to perceive the three universal marks of existence (Ti-lakkhaṇa):

1. Anicca (Impermanence): The failure to see that both the aesthetic object and the subject's biological and psychological capacity to appreciate it are in a state of continuous, unstoppable flux.3

2. Dukkha (Unsatisfactoriness): The failure to recognize that relying on transient aesthetic pleasures for lasting fulfillment is structurally flawed and inherently destined to produce suffering.2

3. Anattā (Non-self): The failure to understand that the "I" who possesses the taste is an empty, dependently originated construct.3

Moha and the Unwholesome Mental Factors

In the highly technical psychological framework of Theravāda Abhidhamma, Avijjā is synonymous with Moha (delusion).3 Moha is classified as a universal unwholesome mental factor (sabbākusalasādhāraṇa cetasika)—meaning it must necessarily arise with every single unwholesome state of consciousness, without exception.3 It functions as a thick darkness that covers the true nature of the five aggregates, preventing the mind from seeing reality as it is.54

Crucially, Moha never operates alone. Aided by its generals—Ahirika (shamelessness) and Anottappa (fearlessness of wrongdoing), as well as Uddhacca (restlessness and distraction)—this king of delusion allows Lobha (craving) and Māna (conceit) to act unchecked.53 When an individual confidently states "not to my taste," Moha is the darkness that prevents them from seeing the absurdity of their claim.

The arrogant assertion of taste is, therefore, a symptom of profound, systemic ignorance. The individual is entirely blind to the vast, complex, and infinite network of causes and conditions (hetu-paccaya) that conspired over eons to create both the physical object and their specific neurological and psychological reaction to it.5 They fail to realize that their "refined" taste is nothing more than a specific karmic footprint, a transient neural firing, and a culturally inherited bias. They are, to borrow the Buddha's striking imagery regarding the terror (saṃvega) of saṃsāric existence, "floundering like fish in small puddles," competing with one another.25 They compete fiercely over whose aesthetic puddle is superior, entirely ignorant of the fact that the puddle itself is rapidly evaporating.

Because Avijjā obscures the impermanent, conditioned nature of the 31 realms of existence, normal human beings (no matter how intelligent or artistically refined) falsely perceive their immediate subjective reality as absolute.59 They seek permanent refuge in the temporary configuration of forms, sounds, and flavors, engaging in the futile, endless endeavor of arranging the deck chairs of the sensory world exactly to their liking, completely unaware that the ship itself is sinking into the ocean of saṃsāra.

The Middle Way: Emptiness of Emptiness and the Resolution of Taste

If the assertion of aesthetic preference is so deeply steeped in Avijjā, Māna, and Diṭṭhi, what is the resolution? Does Buddhist philosophy demand a sterile, anesthetic existence, completely devoid of any appreciation for form, art, or beauty? Does the enlightened being experience the world as a grey, undifferentiated mass?

The resolution to this paradox is found in the Madhyamaka "Middle Way," which navigates carefully between the extremes of naïve realism (absolutism) and radical error theory (nihilism).9 Nāgārjuna's doctrine of the Two Truths (satyadvaya) provides the key: it differentiates between conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya).5

To declare that all aesthetic objects are utterly meaningless, or to intentionally seek out ugliness to punish the ego, would merely be another form of clinging—an inversion of the aesthetic ego that falls headlong into the extreme of nihilism. Nāgārjuna brilliantly posits the "emptiness of emptiness" (śūnyatā-śūnyatā), cautioning that emptiness itself must not be reified into a new, absolute view.40 Emptiness is not a black hole that eradicates conventional reality; rather, it is the very condition that makes conventional reality possible. Because things lack rigid, inherent existence, change, interaction, and subjective experience can occur.43 As Nāgārjuna stated, "Since all is empty, all is possible".43

Therefore, a Buddhist practitioner does not cease to experience the difference between a harmonious melody and a chaotic noise, or a sweet fruit and a bitter root. The sensory contact and the resulting feeling (vedanā) still naturally occur.23 However, the practitioner intercepts the cognitive process before it morphs into papañca and māna. They experience the aesthetic world yathābhūtaṃ (as it is) without the overlay of egoic ownership. A beautiful object is appreciated as a temporary, dependently originated convergence of conditions, without the mind deploying the underlying tendency of lust (rāga) to grasp it.23 An unappealing object is experienced without the mind deploying the tendency of aversion (paṭigha) to violently reject it as "not to my taste."

The enlightened mind operates within conventional reality—using language, acknowledging conventional beauty, and making practical choices—but it does so with a profound internal lightness and serenity.47 As the famous Zen teaching Xin Xin Ming (On Believing in Mind) articulates: "The Perfect Way knows no difficulties, except that it refuses to make preferences. Only when freed from hate and love, it reveals itself fully and without disguise".63 By cultivating insight (vipassanā) and profound humility (soracca), the practitioner dissolves the conceited measurer.4 Releasing the desperate grip on subjective preference allows the individual to step out of the claustrophobic confines of the ego and into the vast, luminous space of unconditioned awareness, finally free from the arrogant pretense of taste.

Works cited

1. What Philosophers Said About Aesthetic Taste | The Centre for Conscious Design, accessed June 13, 2026, https://theccd.org/blog-post/what-philosophers-said-about-aesthetic-taste/

2. Concept of Avijja in Buddhism and its Importance in Contemporary Era, accessed June 13, 2026, https://ijsred.com/volume6/issue2/IJSRED-V6I2P61.pdf

3. Avidyā (Buddhism) - Wikipedia, accessed June 13, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avidy%C4%81_(Buddhism)

4. Māna: The Subtle Nature of Conceit in Buddhism | by Umarsofii | Medium, accessed June 13, 2026, https://medium.com/@umarsofii63/m%C4%81na-the-subtle-nature-of-conceit-in-buddhism-8bf2d6d82cde

5. Nagarjuna – The Two Truths - Buddhism: The Way of Emptiness, accessed June 13, 2026, https://buddhism-thewayofemptiness.blog.nomagic.uk/nagarjuna-the-two-truths/

6. “Dependent Origination = Emptiness” —Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources by Shì hùifēng from the Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies Sri Lanka : r/Buddhism - Reddit, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/1f49nk8/dependent_origination_emptiness_n%C4%81g%C4%81rjunas/

7. Overcoming "naïve realism"? : r/Buddhism - Reddit, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/8p1q6a/overcoming_na%C3%AFve_realism/

8. Significance of Conceit (māna) in Theravada Buddhism - drarisworld - WordPress.com, accessed June 13, 2026, https://drarisworld.wordpress.com/2024/06/29/significance-of-conceit-mana-in-theravada-buddhism/

9. Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy, accessed June 13, 2026, https://iep.utm.edu/madhyamaka-buddhist-philosophy/

10. Dictionary Of Buddhist Doctrinal And Technical Terms, accessed June 13, 2026, https://ia601406.us.archive.org/17/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.23759/2015.23759.Dictionary-Of-Buddhist-Doctrinal-And-Technical-Terms_text.pdf

11. Proto Buddhism - The Original Teachings of the Buddha - By Venerable Dr. Madawela Punnaji Nayaka Maha Thera - Internet Archive, accessed June 13, 2026, https://archive.org/download/artikel-buddhism/ARTIKEL%20BUDDHISM.rar/ARTIKEL%20BUDDHISM%2FBELUM%2F1%2FProto%20Buddhism%20FINAL.pdf

12. (PDF) How Did the Buddha Deal with Conflicts During his Life? A Theravāda Perspective., accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351297264_How_Did_the_Buddha_Deal_with_Conflicts_During_his_Life_A_Theravada_Perspective

13. Madhupindika Sutta: The Ball of Honey - Access to Insight, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.018.than.html

14. The Buddhist Analysis of Mind, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.buddhism.hku.hk/wp-content/uploads/Buddhist-Analysis-of-Mind.pdf

15. UNRAVELLING THE MYSTERIES OF MIND AND BODY THROUGH ABHIDHAMMA | HolyBooks.com, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.holybooks.com/wp-content/uploads/Unravelling-the-Mysteries-of-Mind-and-Body-Through-Abhidhamma.pdf

16. The Dhamma Theory - BuddhaSasana by Binh Anson, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha227.htm

17. Untitled, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/5-personen/analayo/encyclopedia-entries/vedana.pdf

18. Karunadasa - Early Buddhist Teachings - The Middle Position in Theory and Practice, accessed June 13, 2026, https://archive.org/download/karunadasaearlybuddhistteachingsthemiddlepositionintheoryandpractice/Karunadasa%20-%20Early%20Buddhist%20Teachings%20-%20The%20Middle%20Position%20in%20Theory%20and%20Practice_text.pdf

19. Full text of "Tipitaka Pali (Roman script)" - Internet Archive, accessed June 13, 2026, https://archive.org/stream/tipitaka-pali/Buddhist%20Dictionary%20Manual%20of%20Buddhist%20Terms%20and%20Doctrines_djvu.txt

20. Vedanās: Complete Guide to Feelings in Buddhism (a Practical Guide To Being Happy), accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.beingpeacefully.com/dharma-blog/1-complete-guide-to-feelings-vedana-teaching-series

21. An Analytical Study of the Process of Control Feeling (Vedanā) in Theravāda Buddhism, accessed June 13, 2026, https://so09.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/jibs/article/view/2129

22. Feelings/Vedana = pre-conscious? How determined pleasant/unpleasant/neutral? - Q & A, accessed June 13, 2026, https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/feelings-vedana-pre-conscious-how-determined-pleasant-unpleasant-neutral/43606

23. Vedanā Part 1: Addressing Views and Clinging at the Source, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.buddhistinquiry.org/article/vedana-part-1-addressing-views-and-clinging-at-the-source/

24. What is Papañca? - Lion's Roar, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.lionsroar.com/what-is-papanca/

25. Understanding Papanca: The Arrows of Objectification - Tricycle: The Buddhist Review, accessed June 13, 2026, https://tricycle.org/article/papanca/

26. 018 The Honey Ball – Majjima Nikaya, accessed June 13, 2026, https://majjimanikaya.wordpress.com/2018/04/29/18-madhupindika-sutta/

27. 6.14-Madhupindika-S-m18-piya.pdf - The Minding Centre, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.themindingcentre.org/dharmafarer/wp-content/uploads/6.14-Madhupindika-S-m18-piya.pdf

28. Conceptual Proliferation (Papancha) in Theravada Buddhism - drarisworld - WordPress.com, accessed June 13, 2026, https://drarisworld.wordpress.com/2018/03/09/conceptual-proliferation-papancha-in-theravada-buddhism/

29. Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought - ahandfulofleaves, accessed June 13, 2026, https://ahandfulofleaves.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/concept-and-reality-in-early-buddhist-thought_nanananda_1971.pdf

30. Feelings/Vedana = pre-conscious? How determined pleasant/unpleasant/neutral? - #8 by Tobszn - Q & A - Discuss & Discover - SuttaCentral, accessed June 13, 2026, https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/feelings-vedana-pre-conscious-how-determined-pleasant-unpleasant-neutral/43606/8

31. EVAṂ ME SUTTAṂ This is how I heard it - Patrick Kearney, accessed June 13, 2026, https://patrickkearney.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/01_Delusion.pdf

32. Full text of "Buddha's teaching and ambiguity of existence" - Internet Archive, accessed June 13, 2026, https://archive.org/stream/httpsdrive.google.comfiled1gfc-lhl2lex/final%20book_djvu.txt

33. Full text of "lucid24 vitakka and vicara" - Internet Archive, accessed June 13, 2026, https://archive.org/stream/Lucid24VitakkaAndVicara/compstudyvol1_djvu.txt

34. Is Madhyamaka Buddhism Really the Middle Way? - thezensite, accessed June 13, 2026, http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/Is_Madhyamaka_Buddhism.html

35. Does Buddhism assume direct realism? - Reddit, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/1lwo9sn/does_buddhism_assume_direct_realism/

36. (PDF) The Buddhist Pramāṇa -Epistemology, Logic, and Language: with Reference to Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti - ResearchGate, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369634267_The_Buddhist_Pramana_-Epistemology_Logic_and_Language_with_Reference_to_Vasubandhu_Dignaga_and_Dharmakirti

37. Buddhist Phenomenology, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.in.yoga/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/3.-Lusthaus_Buddhist_phenomenology.pdf

38. Ontological Minimalism: Dharmakirti's Buddhist Critique of Relations, accessed June 13, 2026, https://thecjbs.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Ontological-Minimalism_Dharmakirtis-Buddhist-Critique-of-Relations_Dalvi.pdf

39. Nagarjuna | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed June 13, 2026, https://iep.utm.edu/nagarjun/

40. Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness - thezensite, accessed June 13, 2026, http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/Dependent_Arising.htm

41. The Madhyamaka Speaks to the West: A philosophical analysis of nyatas a universal truth - Kent Academic Repository, accessed June 13, 2026, https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/document/42963

42. Mulamadhayamakakarika of Nagarjuna. Philosophy of the Middle Way - TsemRinpoche.com, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.tsemrinpoche.com/download/Buddhism-Philosophy-and-Doctrine/en/David%20J.%20Kalupahana%20-%20Mulamadhyamakakarika%20of%20Nagarjuna.pdf

43. Beauty of Sunyata : r/Buddhism - Reddit, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/i2wrvq/beauty_of_sunyata/

44. Zhuangzi and Nagarjuna on the Truth of No Truth, accessed June 13, 2026, https://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-MISC/101801.htm

45. Zhuangzi and Nagarjuna on the Truth of No Truth - thezensite:, accessed June 13, 2026, http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/Zhuangzi_and_Nagarjuna.html

46. NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY - Tsem Rinpoche, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.tsemrinpoche.com/download/Buddhism-Philosophy-and-Doctrine/en/K.%20Venkata%20Ramanan%20-%20Nagarjuna's%20Philosophy.pdf

47. EXPLORING 'EMPTINESS': CARLO ROVELLI AND NAGARJUNA - Contemplative Inquiry, accessed June 13, 2026, https://contemplativeinquiry.blog/2021/11/08/exploring-emptiness-carlo-rovelli-and-nagarjuna/

48. (PDF) A Study on Conceit (màna) with reference to Theravada Buddhist Tradition, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355873426_A_Study_on_Conceit_mana_with_reference_to_Theravada_Buddhist_Tradition

49. Is it not conceit when you compare yourself to other people? - Buddhism Stack Exchange, accessed June 13, 2026, https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/15389/is-it-not-conceit-when-you-compare-yourself-to-other-people

50. Māna - Wikipedia, accessed June 13, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C4%81na

51. On sakkāya, identity, and substantial reality - Page 15 - Essays - Discuss & Discover - SuttaCentral, accessed June 13, 2026, https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/on-sakkaya-identity-and-substantial-reality/31048?page=15

52. THERAVADA TREATMENT AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: An Ecological Integration of Buddhist Tripartite Practice and Western Rational Analysis A - Murdoch University - Research Portal, accessed June 13, 2026, https://researchportal.murdoch.edu.au/view/pdfCoverPage?instCode=61MUN_INST&filePid=13137071520007891&download=true

53. PATTHANA DHAMMA - Sanskrit Documents, accessed June 13, 2026, https://sanskritdocuments.org/articles/Notes_on_PATTHANA_DHAMMA.pdf

54. Dhamma Threads By Htoo Naing, accessed June 13, 2026, https://abhidhamma-studies.weebly.com/uploads/2/7/7/2/27729113/notes_on_abhidhamma_analysis__htoo_naing.pdf

55. Sutta Nipata: The Sutta Collection - Access to Insight, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/index.html

56. In Or Out - Currents of Dhamma, accessed June 13, 2026, https://currentsofdhamma.substack.com/p/in-or-out-019

57. The Buddhist-Email-List Sutta - dsg@groups.io, accessed June 13, 2026, https://groups.io/g/dsg/topic/the_buddhist_email_list_sutta/5685891

58. How to reconcile the "right view" in the Noble Eightfold path with Snp 4.5?, accessed June 13, 2026, https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/45317/how-to-reconcile-the-right-view-in-the-noble-eightfold-path-with-snp-4-5

59. What Is Avijja (Ignorance)? | Pure Dhamma, accessed June 13, 2026, https://puredhamma.net/key-dhamma-concepts/what-is-avijja-ignorance/

60. Dhamma Talks by Mogok Sayadaw--Part 1 - 台灣原始佛教協會, accessed June 13, 2026, https://oba.org.tw/viewtopic.php?t=2945

61. Nagarjuna – Sunyata - Buddhism: The Way of Emptiness, accessed June 13, 2026, https://buddhism-thewayofemptiness.blog.nomagic.uk/nagarjuna-sunyata/

62. 20th WCP: Professor Matilal's Nåvya-Naive Realism vis-a-vis Dummett-Putnam-Mimamsa Anti-Realisms—Some Metaphysical Worries, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Asia/AsiaBili.htm

63. Beauty, Ugliness, and Aversion - Dharma Wheel, accessed June 13, 2026, https://www.dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?t=35293

**